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Highlights
High-level UN and EU officials, senior legal, policy and military advi-
sors and leading academics in the fields of international humanitar-
ian and human rights law met at the European University Institute 
on 22 February 2013, under the auspices of the Global Governance 
Programme, to discuss the direction and development of EU policy in 
response to targeted killing practices using unmanned aerial vehicles. 
The GGP High-Level Policy Seminar (HLPS) tackled the controversial 
practice of targeted killing using unmanned aerial vehicles from a range 
of law and policy perspectives. The core concerns of the HLPS were: 
 • The desirability for a European response to contemporary US 
practices;
 • The need to develop European policy both to anticipate Member 
State capability acquisition and to influence the emergent norms 
that will shape the proliferated use of UAVs for targeted killing 
operations;
 • Widespread criticism of the opaque nature of the CIA programme.
This Policy Brief proposes in particular that both the EU and Member 
States should start to develop policy positions, in dialogue with each 
other and the US, and that transparency and accountability require-
ments must be fulfilled to enable the legality of targeted killing prac-
tices to be assessed.
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Background
The US practice of targeted killing of terrorist sus-
pects has attracted a great deal of attention in the 
last twelve months. This included the leak of a US 
Department of Justice White Paper that discussed 
legal justification for killing a US national who is 
also a senior operational leader of Al-Qaeda or asso-
ciated force, and the confirmation hearings for John 
Brennan, the nominee (now incumbent) for director 
of the Central Intelligence Agency. Conservative 
estimates suggest that the US targeted killing cam-
paign in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia has caused 
three thousand fatalities over the past decade. This 
immediate context raised the question of European 
States’ approach to the tactic. 
Targeted killing, the intentional premeditated 
killing of an identified individual by a State away 
from a hot battlefield, is neither specifically defined 
nor regulated under international law, but remains 
governed by applicable international humanitarian 
and human rights law. The practice of targeted 
killing has recently converged upon the use of armed 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) that give rise to 
additional considerations and concern, given that 
a number of European States have been reportedly 
seeking to acquire military UAV capabilities.
Current Practices 
Starkly divergent approaches to the legal basis of 
current targeted killing practices are evident in the 
two States that dominate the current practice of tar-
geted killing terrorist suspects. The Israeli Supreme 
Court outlined the legal framework governing the 
targeting of civilians taking direct part in hostilities 
in December 2006, subsequently endorsed by another 
judgment in 2008. The Israeli policy and practice 
has been the subject of two investigating committees. 
The legal framework only applies to targeted killings 
beyond Israel’s borders and is limited only to civil-
ians directly participating in hostilities, provided, 
that less harmful means are unavailable and that the 
proportionality principle is adhered to. Ex-post review 
must be undertaken. The processes by which tar-
geting decisions are made, and subsequently inves-
tigated, are clear. All stages of the decision to target 
an individual must be recorded in writing, and 
a distinction made between facts, assumptions 
and hypotheses. Authorisation is required from 
the highest levels of the military and government, 
and strikes are subject to independent investigation. 
Informal reactions from the Palestinian population 
to the strike may be used to trigger review. Compen-
sation is payable in the event that the ex-post inves-
tigation finds an error or violation of law or proce-
dure. There is a possibility of judicial review by the 
Israeli Supreme Court. Overall, the record of actual 
accountability for errors and deviations from policy 
is not strong, despite a very elaborate legal frame-
work.
The US practices are largely obscure as the legal 
framework has not been disclosed, the involvement 
of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) remains 
classified, and there is no official acknowledgment 
even of operations in which Joint Special Opera-
tions Command (JSOC) participates. Little is known 
about the decision-making process either by the 
JSOC or the CIA, but Congressional Intelligence 
Committees are provided with classified briefings. 
There is currently no provision for judicial review. 
While the geographical location of the strike alleg-
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edly determines whether an operation is currently 
conducted by the Department of Defence (DOD) or 
the CIA, there is widespread criticism of the opaque 
nature of the CIA programme and it is believed that 
its transfer to the DOD would alleviate at least some 
of these issues.  
Governing Law 
Targeted killing raises legal issues with regard both 
to the use of force and the conduct of hostilities. The 
two intertwined US justifications revolve around the 
claim of an ongoing armed conflict with Al-Qaeda 
and associated forces, and to the right of self-defence. 
The claim of self-defence relies on an expanded 
notion of imminence. These justifications were reit-
erated in the US Department of Justice White Paper 
that was leaked immediately prior to the High-Level 
Policy Seminar, but which outlined only the narrow 
position related to targeting (extraterritorially) US 
citizens who were senior members of Al-Qaeda or 
associated force. While indeterminacy regarding the 
legal justification to use force remains problematic, 
it is clear from the legal justifications invoked by the 
US that its targeted killing operations are to be gov-
erned by the armed conflict legal framework. The US 
continues to consider itself in an armed conflict with 
Al-Qaeda and associated forces, and membership 
of either category makes a person targetable. The 
notion of associated force is not defined, but seems 
to involve some concept of co-belligerent groups. 
On what evidential basis another terrorist group is 
deemed an associated force is unclear.
The general consensus of the High-Level Policy 
Seminar is that there is little scope for lawfully con-
ducting targeted killings under the framework of 
human rights law. Questions of legality therefore 
hinge primarily upon the existence of an armed con-
flict and the concomitant temporal and geograph-
ical scope of the battlefield. There is little agreement 
about how human rights and humanitarian law can 
be simultaneously applied in practice. Despite the 
interpretative influences that infuse the principles 
of one into the other, there is a strong preference to 
keep these legal frameworks separate with regard to 
targeted killing. A key risk is the use of law enforce-
ment measures otherwise prohibited by Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law (IHL) on the battlefield 
(such as tear gas), or conversely, the use of military 
grade weapons in law enforcement situations. 
The Idea of the Battlefield
A core divergence between the US and European 
positions revolves around their respective views that 
contemporary targeted killing operations were con-
ducted under the paradigm of armed conflict and 
hence governed by IHL, or fell under law enforce-
ment operations regulated by human rights law. An 
additional point of divergence is that the US declines 
to apply human rights law to complement IHL in 
non-international armed conflicts. 
Some experts advocate a more vocal objection to the 
US invocation of the armed conflict paradigm, not 
least because not all the facts were available to make 
this determination, but also that no European State 
has accepted this paradigm even after a series of ter-
rorist attacks post-9/11. Invoking the armed conflict 
paradigm leads to relative permissiveness for the use 
of force, which is exacerbated by unclear geograph-
ical and temporal boundaries. While the US has 
embraced the concept of global war, and is therefore 
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reluctant to accept geographical limitations to the 
battlefield, several experts express significant doubts 
about the validity this position. European govern-
ments reject the paradigm, but do not comment on 
US strikes undertaken in reliance on the paradigm.
Beyond the narrow considerations over the limita-
tions of the battlefield, the capacity for persistent 
surveillance and constant targeting ability afforded 
by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) may necessitate 
a reappraisal of the current limitations to extraterri-
torial of human rights obligations, as it may become 
tantamount to exercising effective territorial control. 
Transparency and Accountability 
The High-Level Policy Seminar voiced concerns 
over the opaque processes that govern contemporary 
targeted killing practices. There is a general lack of 
information relating to the entire operation, ranging 
from the legal justification underlying the strikes, 
the selection of targets, the chain of command and 
authorisation, and the broader impact of targeted 
killing operations. At a minimum, there needs to 
be: transparency over the legal basis underlying 
these operations, both as a matter of international 
and domestic law; clarity with regard to the opera-
tional responsibility of the entity engaging in these 
practices; and an assessment of the impact through 
independent investigation. Minimal international 
standards and international scrutiny are required 
in addition to domestic measures to ensure compli-
ance. 
While greater transparency is likely to ameliorate a 
number of issues associated with targeted killings 
using UAVs, and despite clear standards expounded 
in human rights law, the transparency standards 
under IHL are less well-developed, not least because 
the International Committee of the Red Cross has 
not explicated the transparency requirements for 
IHL. This lack of transparency criteria under IHL 
is unfortunate because it undermines the call for 
greater transparency for targeted killing campaigns 
conducted under the paradigm of armed conflict.  
The minimum procedural requirement would be a 
prompt and effective investigation, accompanied by 
a mechanism for reparations. Despite the technolog-
ical innovations introduced by the UAVs in targeted 
killing operations, targeting remains the critical 
legal issue and assessing the legality of such strikes 
is hampered by secrecy. A special level of scrutiny 
could be one way of overcoming these difficulties. 
Targeting and Direct Participation in Hos-
tilities
Under the armed conflict framework which the 
US applies, membership in “Al-Qaeda” or an 
“associated force” as determined by the US, renders 
an individual targetable. Members of these groups 
are considered to have a continuous combat func-
tion such that they directly participate in hostili-
ties. The extent or nature of membership required to 
make a person targetable is not defined. But a filter 
of “imminent threat” is applied to decisions about 
whether to target a specific individual. As the US 
Department of Justice White paper indicates, immi-
nence is a wide concept, extending to the “last clear 
chance” to strike the individual rather than his or her 
proximity to an imminent attack. It was also noted 
that in assessments about the proportionality of the 
strike under the laws of war, “military age males” in 
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the vicinity of military activity were deemed as non-
civilian casualties, and thus not relevant to the pro-
portionality analysis.
It was commented that the legality of a strike 
depends on the information available concerning 
the individual and his or her combat role. In tar-
geted killings using UAVs, the direct participation 
requirement is often difficult to meet. The reliance 
on membership without more might be inconsistent 
with the general duty to take precautions.
Personality Strikes and Signature Strikes
There are currently two main methods of identifying 
the individuals for targeted killing strikes. Person-
ality strikes target known individuals who are named 
on secret “kill lists”, while signature strikes depend 
upon pattern of life intelligence indicative of a threat 
posed by the individual. The lack of transparency 
concerning the compilation and maintenance of these 
“kill lists” are at the core of the legal issues relating to 
personality strikes. Signature strikes problematically 
circumvent the requirement of direct participation 
in hostilities and are therefore of dubious legality. It 
was contended by one expert that signature strikes 
essentially avoid the direct participation require-
ment, and are of dubious legality. The discounting of 
“military age males” in the proportionality assess-
ment is similarly an evasion of the legal framework. 
The practice of signature strikes requires a strong 
statement in opposition from other States. 
Clarifying and publicising both the processes 
involved for compiling the “kill lists” and the indi-
viduals who are named on them would ameliorate 
some of the issues related to personality strikes. In 
addition, the lack of transparent accountability pro-
cesses aggravate the legal issues raised, particularly 
by signature strikes, which would require a post-
strike investigation not least for a collateral damage 
and incidental injury assessment that may, in turn, 
indicate necessity for altering future targeted killing 
operations.
Follow-up or “double-tap” strikes were underscored 
as being particularly odious and almost certainly 
constituting a war crime. Even if initially a com-
batant, the victim will be of hor de combat status, 
and at any rate the strike is likely to be unlawful for 
directly attacking first responders. 
Establishing European Norms
While European States are not currently engaging in 
targeted killing using UAVs, and arguably may need 
neither to expound their interpretation of governing 
law nor their policy to govern these practices, there is 
widespread concern about the continuing European 
silence on the issue. A number of European States 
either possess, or have declared their intention to 
develop and to procure, armed UAVs capabilities. 
The prospect of European States deploying armed 
UAVs mandates the development of policy regulating 
their use. Compounding Member State inaction, the 
EU currently does not have a policy on the issue, 
although the EU Council Working Group on Inter-
national Law (COJUR) has been instructed to begin 
a debate on the topic. 
The need to develop a EU policy is fundamental 
for three reasons. First, the lack of European back-
lash against covert US practices could be inter-
preted as acquiescence in contemporary practices, 
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which demand more extensive debate and discus-
sion. Second, failing to establish a robust norm 
could create difficulties for criticising abusive uses 
of UAVs as technological capacities proliferate. Third, 
a European policy is necessary to build relations with 
the US. In particular, there is concern to ensure that 
information passed by the EU to the US, under the 
Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP), 
would be used in a manner inconsistent with EU 
law, and more broadly that there is potential of third 
State complicity because of information-sharing. To 
ensure a continuing political willingness to coop-
erate with the US on counter-terrorism issues, 
it would be necessary to convince the European 
Parliament and the public opinion that safeguards 
are in place in relation to the sharing of information.
Articulating a European policy would be benefi-
cial both to provide a clear critique of the current 
US position and to propose viable policy alterna-
tives. Moreover, if unchallenged, the peril that pro-
tracted practice of targeted killing through the use 
of UAVs will become accepted as international law 
will remain. The development of a European policy 
may evince opposition to those States which cur-
rently possess and use UAVs for targeted killing 
operations, from unilaterally developing the legal 
standards governing their use.
Many experts believe that it is not necessary to have 
a specific EU position at this point, especially since 
the EU does not possess any specific expertise on 
IHL, and it may be beneficial for Member States 
to adopt and clarify their own stance on the issue 
independently. Differences between common and 
civil law approaches may further hinder the timely 
development of a harmonised EU position. Indeed, 
encouraging European States to develop their own 
policy positions may have the benefit of circum-
venting direct confrontation with the US over their 
current targeted killing practices by paving an indi-
rect route to principled critique instead. 
Proliferation and Global Dialogue
UAV technology is capable of widespread prolifera-
tion and potentially democratises the use of force to 
sub-State entities and even individuals. Numerous 
States currently possess this technology, or are on 
the trajectory to acquire it in the near future. In 
particular, China’s reported consideration to use a 
UAV to kill extraterritorially a drug lord allegedly 
responsible for the deaths of eleven of its nationals 
underscores the need to establish consensus over the 
limitations for targeted killing practices with UAVs. 
There is also a sense that rapid technological 
advancement, and their military applications, was 
outstripping the ability of the law to sufficiently 
regulate its use. While extant legal principles remain 
clearly applicable, there is a lack of clarity in their 
translation to practical standards. 
Policy Recommendations
On 23 May 2013,  President Obama delivered an 
important Counterterror Policy speech that was 
accompanied by the release of a brief Presidential 
Policy Guidance. While these initiatives represent 
important early steps towards addressing some of 
our concerns, there remain significant ambiguity 
with regard to the standards and procedures gov-
erning targeted killings through the use of UAVs. To 
guard against future normalisation of the practice 
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of targeted killing, transparency and accountability 
must move to the foreground to ensure the practice 
remains exceptional.  In light of the issues and con-
cerns raised during the past months, we propose the 
following recommendations:
•	 The non-policy of European institutions and 
States on this issue has a limited lifespan. Not 
only US policy, but proliferation and European 
States’ own interest in the technology strongly 
underscores the need for each European State to 
develop its own position about targeted killings 
and UAVs, and this position will be shaped 
in dialogue with the American approach. An 
agenda should be established for European legal 
advisors to initiate the process of a European 
discussion and to strive towards a consensus, 
where possible.
•	 The EU should consider the best modality 
by which to engage Member States on the 
issue directly. This would help Europe to 
assist and influence any articulation of global 
standards. The EU, led on this issue by the 
Counter-terrorism Coordinator, might consider 
developing its own policy positions.
•	 Sharing information is a critical issue such that 
without further clarification, future cooperation 
with the US could be jeopardised. The EU 
should seek engagement with the US Congress 
to demonstrate that the law enforcement 
paradigm is not overly restrictive.
•	 Consideration should be given to a non-
proliferation regime that Europe can spearhead. 
Particular attention needs to be given to non-
State acquisition of weaponised UAVs and the 
concomitant threats.
•	 The processes for creating the “kill lists” that 
name targetable individuals for personality 
strikes should be made clear and transparent. 
The procedures involved in confirming the 
identity of named individuals for particular 
targeted killing operations, and the precautions 
taken, also requires transparency. A restricted 
interpretation of imminence needs to be 
affirmed, and a mechanism for appeal and 
removal should be established.
•	 Signature strikes need to be strictly limited, and 
if conducted,  should be carefully scrutinised 
for their legality. Follow-up “double-tap” strikes 
should be unreservedly condemned as unlawful.
•	 Developing specificity in the applicable 
standards is a key hurdle and States should not 
be left to make the final decision. Existing rules 
retain much traction and relevance, and claims 
about the need to revise or re-invent the existing 
legal rules should be carefully scrutinised.
•	 Any set of principles must address the need 
for strong accountability mechanisms, based 
on international law, for this tactic and 
this technology. A threshold for initiating 
independent investigation and principles that 
regulate such investigations need to be clearly 
articulated.
President Obama’s Counterterror Policy 
Speech and Presidential Directive
On May 23, 2013, President Obama announced a 
new Presidential Policy Guidance governing targeted 
killings. In his speech, President Obama announced 
an intention to transfer all targeted killing opera-
tions away from the CIA to the Department of 
Defence, and mooted the possibility of judicial or 
other oversight over such operations. The Guidance, 
a summary of which has been released, attempts to 
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address some of the criticisms and questions of the 
kind raised by experts during the High-Level Policy 
Seminar. In particular, the Guidance articulates a 
preference for capture over lethal force, authorises 
lethal force against a target that poses a “continuing, 
imminent threat” to US persons, and requires “near 
certainty” that non-combatants will not be injured 
or killed. It also disavows the so-called military-
aged males standard for determining combatancy. 
The Guidance provides a clearer and more compre-
hensive statement on such issues than has been pre-
viously made available in US government officials’ 
speeches on the practice of targeted killing. How-
ever, many concerns raised in the High-Level Policy 
Seminar remain unaddressed, including the con-
tinued application of the “armed conflict” frame-
work, the interpretation of combatant applied in tar-
geted decisions, the meaning of “associated forces” 
and of “imminence”. The Guidance also leaves open 
the possibility of signature strikes, and the use of 
targeted killing in support of another state’s security 
interests. The Guidance also indicates that targeted 
killing will remain an important part of US counter-
terrorism strategy for the foreseeable future.
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